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Executive Summary 
. . 
Concern is growing within the CGIAR community and outside over the control and 
ownership of the centers’ genebank collections. Past reviews of the legal status of these 
collections have considered their status unclear; the headquarters agreements of some 
centers could be interpreted as giving succession rights on the collections to the host 
country. 
In this paper, we first review the legal status of the centers themselves, then the 
status of their germplasm collections. In our assessment, the centers that were createci 
under the aegis of the CGIAR, and set up by agreement between or among internation 
legal entities (mostly FAO, UNDP and the World Bank as co-sponsors of the CGIAR) enjoy 
full international legal status. This implies that the termination of a headquarters agreement 
by the host country will not affect the legal existence of a center. However, the situation 
would appear weaker for centers created under the law of the host country. This holds icr 
some centers created prior to the CGIAR, namely IRRI, CIP and IITA. The legal provisions 
of two other centers whose creation preceded that of the CGIAR, namely CIMMYT ant 
CIAT, have since been “internationalized” as their establishment arrangements governed 
by domestic law had been considered to offer insufficient protection of import, export and 
tax privileges and to imply too high a risk of civil liability in the host country. 
With regard to the legal status of the germplasm collections of the centers, our 
review of establishment instruments and headquarters agreements of centers holding and 
maintaining germplasm collections finds that in only one instance is there an explicrt 
provision on ownership of germplasm: WARDA’s germplasm holdings are owned by Its 
member states with WARDA being “the legal custodian”. Other centers have privileges in 
regard to import and export of genetic material without duties and restrictions, subject ~nty 
to quarantine and phyto-sanitary regulations; the headquarters agreements of these centers 
are silent on the question of ownership of genetic material. 
Most establishment instruments and/or headquarters agreements contain explicit 
provisions on the dissolution of centers and the consequent disposition of center assets. 
While land and improvements would pass back to the host state (which generally provided 
the land for the center in the first place), other assets are designated to stay within the host 
country to be distributed to institutions with objectives similar to those of the dissolved 
center, The Board of Trustees of a center would generally have to agree, and in some 
cases is expected to consult with the CGIAR. 
It is our view that the centers’ genebank collections cannot be considered among a 
center’s assets, and in case of a centers cessation would thus not be distributed within the 
State. While most national genebanks are still considered the property of the State or a 
public authority, CGIAR policy has clearly defined the roles of the centers as that of 
custodians, and the material is derived from source nations on the understanding that it will 
be used for the benefit of global research. Thus, the centers’ rights in this material are 
subject to the rights of the beneficiaries. Their trusteeship responsibility has to be seen as 
irrevocable as long as a center legally exists. As a result, the genebank material is legally 
beyond the reach of the host nation government. 
As custodians or trustees of their germplasm collections, the centers have the duty 
to manage them for the benefit of their beneficiaries, that is the developing countries. This 
management responsibility includes the maintenance of the assets held in trust and their 
defense against physical destruction as well as the appropriation through intellectual 
property rights. An appropriate strategy to fend off the risk of appropriation may involve 
the filing for a patent or seeking other forms of intellectual property protection. 
The duty to maintain the collections and to defend them against physical 
deterioration and possible destruction also entails an obligation of the centers as trustees 
to duplicate these collections systematically in different geographical zones. We emphasize 
that this obligation exists irrespective of political circumstances prevailing in a host country. 
To clearly identify the beneficiary of the trust is important. While CGIAR Policy 
documents variously refer to humanity, all people, and present and future generations of 
research workers in all countries throughout the worlds as benefitting from the centers’ 
germplasm collection efforts, the purpose of the establishment of the CGIAR in order to 
meet the food needs of the developing countries suggests that these countries should be 
iv 
considered the primary beneficiaries also of the collection effort. This will, of course, not 
preclude the free release oi germplasm as has been cenrer poiicy to date. We aiso 
anticipate that only if the developing countries are clearly seen as the beneficiaries of the 
centers’ genebank collections, will they be willing to allow continued free access to their 
germplasm resources. 
We have reviewed the implications of the base collections network proposed by FAO 
should the centers decide to join it. This would be possible with appropriate modifications 
(which we have spelt out) of the current proposals to accommodate the centers’ position 
as custodians. While gains would be small in terms of strengthening the legal status of the 
materials, the centers would gain political standing in case a genebank operation is under 
threat of war, civii disturbances, interference from country authorities or natural disasters. 
We also believe that the centers’ accession to the proposed FAO network wculd encourage 
countries to follow their example; this could lead to more effective international oversight 
of national genebanks. 
I. Introduction 
The CGIAR centers, now sixteen in number, have been set up with very different 
legal provisions and instruments. As a result, they enjoy different degrees of protection 
from action and intervention on the part of public authorities in the countries in which they 
operate. 
In the past, a major concern for the centers has. been the free movement of, and 
the privileges and immunities enjoyed by, expatriate scientists and staff, which to en 
important degree influence a center’s ability to recruit competent staff. Surprisingly little 
concern has been expressed with regard to the unencumbered movement and storage sf 
germplasm. With growing public awareness of the importance of CGiAR gene&r.,< 
operations, the question is now being posed of the possibility that civil riots or events of war 
would threaten the existence of these unique collections. During recent poiiticai 
developments in Ethiopia, the fate of the national genebank remained uncertain for some 
time. This has lent urgency to the debate. 
In Chapter I, the study will review the legal arrangements under which the CGPF! 
centers have been established, especially those provisions relating to the handling and 
storage of germplasm in case a center ceases to exist. Many headquarters agreements 
provide formulas for the disposal of assets of a center in case of its dissolution. But thee 
is doubt that the CGIAR germplasm collections can be treated as assets like real estate 
and improvements. Such a legal interpretation might have been acceptable in the past, but 
could now well be challenged in light of the CGIAR’s 1989 policy statement on plant genetic 
resources. Under the heading “ownership,” this document states that “it is the CGIA~R 
policy that collections assembled as a result of international collaboration should not 
become the property of any single nation, but should be held in trust for the use of presert 
and future generations of research workers in all countries throughout the world.” AS these 
collections are held in trust, and thus not owned by the centers, whose are they if a center 
ceases to exist? 
Chapter II will investigate the implications of the trusteeship concept for the quesicr: 
of who controls the genebank collections of the international centers. It will also review the 
ownership and control of other genebank accessions which have not been assembled “as 
a result of international cooperation” but are the product of the centers own research such 
as constructs and elite lines, or are proprietary lines the centers have acquired, with or 
without an obligation to protect them. To our knowledge, centers are not currently storing 
proprietary items in their collections, but may do so in future, especially when incorporating 
biotechnological advances into their breeding programs. 
Chapter III will review the “Base Collections Network” proposed by the FAO, and the 
potential applicability of the FAO’s three proposed models for the center base collections. 
In doing so, it will focus both on legal feasibility and on policy choices, and in this latter 
context, will review the alternatives available to construct a legal and physical framework 
that would safeguard the sumival of the center genebank collections if the existence of a 
center is at risk. 
In Annex I we have included assessments by some centers of how they 
status of their genebank collections and whether they would be ready to include 
FAO’s proposed base coilection network. Annex II contains a descriptior 
establishment arrangements of individual centers which operate genebanks or other:i:ss 
store germplasm. In Annex Ill we have included a draft agreement for the transfer of njepr yic. . . 
genetic material by the international centers which we were asked to prepare. 
II. Establishment Arrangements of the international Centers and their Provisions 
for the Handling and Storage of Germplasm 
In recent years, concerns have been expressed about the status and safeguarcmc 
of germpiasm collections of the international centers should the operations of a center ccrre 
to an end. This could be because the Board or the host country so decides, or it cc~:c 
derive from war or natural disasters that threaten the center’s operations. During recez 
political developments in Ethiopia, the fate of the national genebank remained uncerta,? ‘:’ 
some time. This has lent urgency to the debate. 
TWO longer-term developments have heightened these concerns: First, the cerrsrj 
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collections have grown and now account for more than 13% of unduplicated genebank 
zzcessions of the centers’ mandated crops. Thus, the critical importance of their survivai 
3s stock for future breeding work has become obvious. Second, international discussion 
has focussed on the question of who controls the germplasm; some countries of origin 
claim ownership rights. 
These concerns have led to at least two earlier reviews of the legal environment in 
which the CGIAR centers operate, one by the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic 
Resources, the other by TAC. In addition, individual centers have reviewed their legal 
positions. In this chapter we will discuss these earlier reviews, and analyze the 
establishment arrangements of the various CGIAR centers which maintain genebanks or 
other germplasm storage facilities, with particular attention to their provisions in regard to 
the treatment and disposal of such facilities in case of cessaticn of operations, Details of 
the arrangements surrounding the creation of individual centers and the legal instruments 
that led to their creation are set out in Annex II. It should be noted that our review wiil cniy 
cover those centers which maintain germplasm collections, i.e. the so-called commodity 
centers plus ILRAD and ILCA. It will exclude IBPGR/IPGRI, IFPRI, ISNAR and MA. 
A. Previous Reviews 
In 1986, the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources conducted a 
comprehensive review of the legal status of national and international institutions operating 
genebanks.’ With regard to the legal status of the CGIAR centers it concluded that these 
centers can be considered international only in a loose sense because of their international 
support and objectives, and their relative autonomy within their host countries. 
. . . they cannot be considered “international” in the strict sense, since they are not created 
by a formal treaty conciuded among States or other international legal persons, and their 
activities are not directed by States or such other international legal persons. (...I 
Notwithstanding this international support and their enjoyment of certain international 
privileges, the IARCs are usually national corporations, established and operating under 
the law of their host state, 
’ Commission on Plant Genetic Resources. Legal Siatus of Base and Active Collections of Plant 
Gene?ic Resaurces, dot. CPGRi8715, December 1986 
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At the same time the Commission found that, because of the fact that control over 
policy information and implementaticn ~a)s shared MWeen national and /ntematicgaj 
representatives on the various Board of Trustees, 
,a* irrespective of their legal status, these IARCs cannot be considered simply as naiional 
institutions. Therefore, tine genebanks maintained by the IARCs are neither under the 
control of any given State or national authority, nor in the private sector. Their status is, 
in fact, sui generis. , , 
We agree with the assessment of the FAO Commission with regard to the status of 
certain of the centers established prior to the creation of the CGIAR. As discussed later, 
however, the centers since established (or re-established) have full international legal 
personality. 
With regard to plant genetic resources held in national genebanks the Commission 
found that in the majority of cases these were considered property of the governmer,: cr 
the state. On the basis of disparate assessments received from a number of CGIN? 
centers, according to which some centers. considered themselves owners of the germcizs? 
whiie others did not, the Commission concluded that the formal legal ownership remained 
“unclear.” 
There is no certainty that, if a legal dispute regarding the ownership of material actually 
arose, a court would support this position [of ownership]. In fact, the lack of legal 
provisions in the documents under which IARCs have been established generates an 
element of uncertainty in the settlement of the problem of ownership. Since the IARCs 
are mostly national corporations established and operating under the law of their host 
state, the ownership of the plant genetic resources would be, in principle, governed by fhe 
national law applicable to the IARCs concerned. 
’ ibid,: ‘I.,. ClAT and IRRl . . . do not consider themselves the owners of the material, but rather :Pe 
custodians or depositories thereof. In that context, however, it is not clear on behalf of what legal perssns 
the material is held and whether these institutes’ freedom to dispose of such material is limited by any 
rights retained by third parties. JCARDA states that the Center is custodian of the germplasm, ‘&ithGL: 
explicitly excluding ownership. .,. ICRISAT considers that the institute is the owner of the plant genetIc 
resources which it has collected or received, although its Constitution does not contain any explicrt 
provision on the subject. . . . IITA . . . states that it works on the basis that it owns, like all other acqurred 
assets any genetic material in its possession.” 
4 
In a separate 1988 report on plant genetic resource?, TAC suggested that 
“ownership of genebanks held by the Commodity Centers [was] partly conditioned by their 
agreements with their host countries”, adding that these differed considerably among 
Centers. Based on a canvassing of the Commodity Centers, the TAC document included 
a description of the legal arrangements of individual centers with respect to the long-term 
security of their germplasm collections, The canvas results are reprinted in Appendix I. The 
TAC document suggested that Center boards give high priority to the ownership issue, and 
where necessary, seek to revise headquarters agreements4 
The TAC document recognizes the need for long-term security of the collections 
while accommodating political sensitivities of countries concerning ownership and value of 
germplasm originating from within their territories. It avoids taking sides in the disputes 
over whether a country has the sovereign right over its germplasm and can control its 
outflow: but suggests that once a country has collaborated in a collection effort any 
ownership right to the collected material ceases. The germplasm would then be held by 
Centers in trust for all people. By introducing the trusteeship concept’, TAC suggested 
a basis for the centers’ genebank operations which, as we will show in Chapter 111, offers 
a sustainable legal framework. It was subsequently adopted as CGIAR policy.6 
In addition, individual centers have reviewed their legal position from time to time. 
According to a recent Survey by IBPGR (see Annex II), with one exception, all centers that 
replied appear to still hold that their genebank collections are part of center assets and 
would be treated as such in case of dissolution of a center. 
TAC Document AGR/TAC:IAW88/4 “CGIAR Policy on Plant Genetic Resources”, Rome, February 
1988 
4 TAC ibid.: “Where necessary, Boards should seek to revise their agreement with their host 
countries to ensure that, in the event of the center ceasing to operate, the provisions made for the future 
of germplasm collections are consistent with CGIAR policies. In general, provisions should be made for 
samples of all accessions to be transferred to an alternative genebank, if conditions arise that prevent ?he 
center from continuing its operations. The alternative genebank should be nominated by the Board of 
Trustees in consultation with the CGIAR.” 
’ “Collections assembled as a result of international collaboration should not become the propeny 
of any single nation, but should be held in trust’ [by the CGIAR centers]. 
’ “CGIAR Policy on Plant Genetic Resources’. 1989 IBPGR Rome 
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B. Assessment 
No two establishment arrangements for CGIAR centers are alike. The way they 
were set up was determined as much by the legal culture of the sponsors as by that of the 
host countries. Some were founded on a contractual basis, often sealed and signed before 
a notary public, while others, in particular more recent centers, were based on more 
comprehensive arrangements involving international organizations (and indirectly the CGIAR) 
and thus implicating formal international law. 
Establishment arrangements generally include several legal instruments. Typically 
two such instruments are used: one is an instrument establishing a center as a legal entity, 
generally a document signed by one or several sponsors who may be private individuals, 
national or international organizations, or states, including the host country; the second is 
a headquarters agreement between the host country and the center which sets out mu::al 
rights and obligations induding the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the center and its 
staff. In some cases, the headquarters agreement was signed before the formal creztix 
of the center, by an organization that had -been requested by the CGIAR to negotiate s::n 
agreement on its behalf. When the center was created, that organization would endcrs? 
all rights under the agreement to the new center. 
An important question is whether an establishment instrument can be revoked ard 
by whom. Normally, because the establishment instrument has created a legal entity, tk 
establishment instrument cannot be revoked or annulled by the founders. The only ie;~! 
way of dissolving a center is by decision of its members, generally through the board c’ 
trustees. The establishment instrument or the Board charter (constitution, by-laws) wouic: 
set out the conditions under which a center can be dissolved, and the majority required ‘c’ 
such a decision. While some headquarters agreements allow the host country governmen: 
to revoke them or have a specified term (most do not), the termination of the agreemen’: 
would not affect the legal existence of a center but rather its right to residence in that 
country. Should a host government elect to revoke a headquarters agreement, this WC&! 
force a center to relocate its operations to another country. 
“Pacta sunt sefvanda”, whether they have been concluded under natiohsi c: 
international law. Yet, in political terms, there is clearly a difference as to the “durabli;ry 
of covenants and provisions challenged in situations of war or public disorder or by !X 
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action of a host government. Breach of contract under national law entails compensation 
claims uvdcr national lava. Violation of international law, however, can generals 
international pressure which may well induce a potential violator to refrain from such action. 
And their direct sponsorship in setting up several CGIAR centers would probably induce 
international agencies such as FAO, UNDP and the World Bank to take a strong stance 
should a host country violate its obligations vis-a-vis a center on its territory. 
Both in terms of the legal quality of their establishment arrangements and of the 
political sustainability of these arrangements, we consider the current establishment 
arrangements satisfactory with three exceptions, Unlike CIMMYT and CIAT whose legal 
set-up has been renegotiated in the mid-1980s IRRI and CIP are operating under legal 
arrangements made prior to the creation of the CGIAR. Both centers have been set up 
under local law, and in both cases the host governments could default on their 
commitments with no more formal legal response available than claims for damages 
resultjng as a legal consequence. llTA negotiated a new headquarters agreement in i 986 
which, however, did not change its status as a legal entity incorporated under Nigerian law. 
Of course, we believe that practical realities also in the case of these three centers wc:iC 
likely cause their host nations to refrain from defaulting on their commitments under ;!z: 
national laws. 
1. Privileges, Immunities and the Treatment of Germplasm 
Most centers enjoy fairly generous privileges and immunities. This includes the ri#t 
to import and export, without taxes or restrictions, goods needed for center operations, as 
well as broader freedom from taxes and local jurisdiction, Expatriate staff mostly enjoys 
privileges and immunities similar to those granted by the host country to United Nations 
staff. 
Specific provisions for the treatment of genetic material are included in some of the 
more recent center agreements, generally specifying that imports and exports are 
unrestricted, with imports having to comply with phyto-sanitary and quarantine regulations 
of the host country, 
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2. Cessation of Operations and the Status of Genebanks 
One should distinguish between two scenarios here: the legal dissolution of a center; 
and a hostile termination of its operation as may be the result of war or civil disturbances 
in the host country. The formal legal arrangements are, of course, much more iikely i.0 
be relevant in the first case. 
Most agreements s include provisions for the dissolution of a center. The 
establishment instruments (constitution, by-laws, charter) generally spell out the terms and 
conditions and the voting rules for the members or the board of trustees to dissolve a 
center, and also specify what should happen with center assets. The host government is 
normally in the position to influence the decision only through its membership in the center 
or on its board, but the headquarters agreement often sgells out what will happen with 
center assets. Typically, land and improvements -thereon pass to the government 
(especially in cases where the government has made land available to a center), wnile 
other assets can be retained by the host government or be disposed of at the governments 
discretion. In several agreements, however, agreement with the board will be needed fc: 
such disposal, and consultation with the CGIAR may be called for. 
Some centers consider the dissolution rules applicable to their germplasm collections, 
with the effect that the collections would become property of the host government and could 
be disposed of by the government without restrictions under generally rather liberal (for Fe 
Government that is) provisions contained in host cotintry agreements.’ 
As will be developed below, we disagree with this interpretation. According to the 
CGlAR policy statement mentioned earlier (and to the understandings from nations that 
supplied the germplasm), centers hold the germplasm in trust, and thus do not own it jilts 
other assets. Consequently, it should not be considered among the assets available for 
distribution in the event of dissolution, In our view, the trusteeship concept calls for 
different treatment which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
The other scenario to consider is what would happen to a centers germplasm 
collection if the center falls victim to hostilities and has to stop its operations. The practical 
arrangements here are those taken in advance. Only in the case of WARDA did we find 
’ See Annex I 
a provision which requires WARDA to deposit its germplasm samples “with the most 
appropriate international germplasm bank” (see Annex II). As the discussion in the 
following chapter will show, we believe that the trusteeship concept devolves obligations on 
a center not dissimilar to those stipulated in the WARDA agreement. 
III. The Trusteeship Concept and its Consequences for the Genebank Collections 
Eeld by CGIAR Centers 
As described above, the CGlAR stated in 1989 that, “it is CGIAR policy that 
collections assembled as a result of international collaboration should not become the 
property of any single nation, but should be held in trust for the use of-present and future 
generations of research workers in all countries throughout the world.“* This is certainly 
a description of the CGIAR system’s intentions with respect to the future of these resources; 
it may also be a description of the understanding under which the materials were collected 
and held since acquisition; 
The interpretation of this concept is particularly important in two contemporary 
contexts. These are the operational questions that are sometimes summed up in the 
question, “who owns the germplasm in the genebanks?” 
In the first context, already explored above, a Center builds up a collection of genetic 
material that it has received from a variety of nations “in trust,” and the Center then leaves 
the host nation (sometimes but normally not the source of the materiai) in which it is 
operating. This departure could derive from the Center’s choice or the Center might be 
forced out by host government decision. Are the genetic materials then subject to the host 
nation’s control or must they be returned to the source nation or must they be transferred 
to another center that will conserve them or use them for research purposes? 
In the second context, arising from the new commercialization of germplasm, a 
Center holding such materials considers the possibility that someone will obtain intellectual 
property protection on certain of the genes contained in the materials. Is the Center free 
8 CGIAR Policy on Plant Genetic Resources (1989). 
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to do so? Must it do so if it fears that a third party will obtain such protection? If it does 
so, what are its rights and obligations with respect to any financial proceeds? 
A. Origins of the Trust Concept 
In attempting to interpret this concept of “trust,” a concept that was almost certainly 
used in a relatively non-technical way by the CGIAR, one must begin by considering the 
international meaning, if any, that can be attributed to the term “trust.” Although there is 
little formal international law in the area, the leading international application of the trust 
concept is in another non-technical context, namely the international trusteeship 
arrangement under which certain nations served as trustees for certain former dependent 
areas at the end of World War II.’ 
This United Nations system was an evolutionary development of the Mandate system 
of the League of Nations, created at Versailles:” 
To those colonies and territories‘ which as a consequence of the late war have 
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which 
are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being 
and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for 
the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. 
Under this Mandate system, specific nations supervised the development of the mandates; 
the supervising nations reported in turn to the League institutions. The United Natior*s 
system followed a similar intellectual tradition and overall design, even repeating the word: 
“sacred trust.“” 
The most careful study found on the history and origin of this concept traced it back 
to four possible sources: Spanish legal scholars of the 16th century, British color~a: 
’ See United Nations Charter, Chapter XI, Xii, and XIII. 
” The Covenant of the League of Nations, AMe 22. Entered into force January 10, 1920. 
” United Nations Charter, Article 73. 
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doctrine, United States doctrine preceding World War I, and the diplomats who created the 
League of Nations and the United Nations. The study viewed the diplomats as playing a 
role that was more pragmatic than conceptual and found that the Spanish legal scholars 
were the source of the intellectual concept of an obligation to protect the peoples involved. 
Nevertheless, the first quoted use of the actual word, “trust,” in this context, however, was 
by an English politician, Edmund Burke? 
Edmund Burke’s priority undoubtedly reflected the fact that the legal doctrine of a 
trust (as opposed to the broader concept of an obligation to the peoples involved) is, in 
large part, a unique Anglo-Saxon concept. The fundamental trust concept is of a trustee 
holding property in trust for another person, the beneficiary. There may be Roman or 
Germanic origins, but the divided early English judicial system involved one set of courts 
that dealt with the formal legal ownership rights of the trustee and another that dealt with 
the equitable rights of the beneficiary? 
The trust owes its peculiar character to the more or less accidental circumstance 
that in England in the fifteenth century, and for four hundred years thereafter, there were 
separate cour!s of law and equity. . It was possible therefore for one person to have 
the legal title to property and for another to compel him to exercise his legal rights for the 
other’s benefit. There would be nothing extraordinary about the trust if the matter had 
stopped there. But the courts of equity went further than merely to impose personal 
duties on the holder of the legal title. They gave the beneficiary an interest in the 
property and gave him protection in the enjoyment of that interest. The result is 
something unique: a double form of ownership. Down below is the trustee who holds the 
legal title; above him is the beneficiary who has the equitable ownership.14 
The concept is so unusual -- but also broadly useful -- that there has recently 
been negotiated a special Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their 
Recognition, designed to ensure that the relative rights of the trustee and the beneficiary 
l2 R. N. Chowdhuri, Inrernafional Mandates and Trusteeship Systems; A Comparative Study (Martinus 
Nijhoff: The Hague 1955) pp. 13-33. 
l3 Potter’s Hkrmd /m&~ti~~n to ,%g/ish Law, pp. 604-606 (4th Ed. 1958). 
l4 A. Scott & W. Fratcher, 1 The Law of Trusts 3-4 (1987). 
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are recognized in those jurisdictions for which the trust concept is unfamiliar? 
B. Legal Significance of the Concept 
1. In International Law 
a. Public International Law 
To the extent that there is an international law doctrine of trust, it is that defined by 
the International Court of Justice in interpreting the Trusteeship provisions of the United 
Nations Charter. That approach has been very much a pragmatic one of attempting to 
define the wisest approach to managing the territories so as actually to benefit their 
residents. 
The legal disputes arose over Namibia, then South West Africa, a League Mandz:~ , 
territory placed under the supervision of- South Africa after World War I. When the Ur;~t~s 
Nations replaced the League after World War II and the UN’s Trusteeship system replaczs 
the League’s Mandate system, South Africa refused to transfer the territory voluntarily ;s 
Trusteeship status, believing that it could thus avoid UN supervision. There followed 2 
variety of international legal actions dealing with the extent to which the League’s rig% 
were transformed into United Nations rights even in the absence of South Africa’s conser::. 
Of the various International Court of Justice opinions, the most relevant was that of i 91: , 
an advisory opinion in which it was asked to define the legal effect of a Security Count.! 
Resolution which declared “that the continued presence of the South African authorities P 
Namibia is illegal.“‘6 In discussing the League’s “sacred trust” concept, the Court w:c:z 
. * . Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in 
accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion, the Court is 
Is Final Act of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Fifteenth Session, The Has-2 
October 20, 1984, reprinted at 23 In?/. Leg. Mats. 1388 (1984). As of mid-1990, Canada. :z I 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States had either signed or rat&c: 
See also discussion under b. below. 
I6 Security Council Resolution 276 (30 January 1970). 
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bound to take into account the fact that the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the 
Covenant - “the strenuous conditions of the modern world” and “the wall-being and 
development” of the peoples concerned - were not static, but were by definition 
evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the “sacred trust.” The parties to the 
Covenant must consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such. . . , Moreover, 
an in?emational instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the 
entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation. In the domain to which the 
present proceedings relate, the last fifty years, as indicated above, have brought important 
developments. These developments leave little doubt that the ultimate cbjective of the 
sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of the peoples concerned.” 
According to the Court, the “sacred trust” notion which had remained undefined in 
the Mandate covenant had to be interpreted not as its drafters would have understood it 
(which they had not speit out) but as the interests of the beneficiaries required it fifty years 
later. While not explaining the trusteeship concept itself, the rujing suggests that the 
interests of the beneficiaries under an international trust arrangements must be defined in 
a dynamic fashion, and must be understood as they evolve over time. 
b. Private lnt&n~tionai Law 
In a sense, the newly negotiated Hague Convention is no more than an international 
arrangement to support domestic doctrines governing trusts. Nevertheless, it gives these 
doctrines international recognition, and is also encouraging a spread of trust ideas to new 
nations, Although much of the draft Convention covers choice of law issues, the draft does 
have certain substantive provisions, of which the most relevant is Article 11: 
A trust created [normally in another country] in accordance with the law specified 
by the preceding Chapter shall be recognized as a trust [in any other country that is a 
member of the Convention]. Such recognition shall imply, as a minimum, that the trust 
property constitutes a separate fund . . , . 
in so far as the law applicable to the trust requires or provides, such recognition 
shall imply, in particular - 
l7 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. Reports 16, 31. 
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a that personal creditors of the trustee shall have no recourse against the trust 
assets; 
b that the trust assets shall not form part of the trustee’s estate upon his insolvency 
or bankruptcy; 
d that the trust.assets may be recovered when the trustee, in breach of trust, has 
mingled trust assets with his own property or has alienated trust assets. . , 
As will be seen, for the issues covered in this memorandum, this is absolutely consistent 
with the domestic law positions which are about to be described. 
2. In National Law 
The most complete exposition of the concept is in its national law source. Hence, 
it is important to review these national conceptions, and the Anglo-Saxon iaw is Pie cxx 
within which the trust concept appears ‘to have developed. 
a. The Anglo-Saxon Tradition 
In Anglo-Saxon law, a trust is created by a settlor who places certain assets ifi trxs! 
under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary. Thus, a will might direct that 
a business be managed by a trustee who would control and operate it until a minor i-e/r 
becomes old enough to take over the business. At that time the trust would be terminated 
and the assets of the trust given to the heir. 
Under this Anglo-Saxon theory, a trust in the genetic resources might have been 
created by the CGIAR declaration as owner of the materials it held in the genebanks. 
Alternatively, under the implicit understandings with the nations of origin, the genebanks 
took the materials as trustees; and the CGIAR statement is a recognition of the preexisting 
status of the materials. In the first case, by analogy, the CGIAR, acting as owner, wccid 
be placing the materials in trust, under its own (or the Centers’) trusteeship. In the secsnc 
case, source nations gave the material to the Centers in trust, under the Centers’ 
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trusteeship.‘* In either case, the beneficiary would be either “present and future 
gereratlons of research workers in all countries throughout Ihe world” or the farmers of the 
developing world as the beneficiaries of the work of those researchers. 
In general, under a trust of this type, the assets held in trust are not regarded as 
assets of the trustee, so that a third party could not obtain the assets in settlement of an 
obligation of the trustee. ” It is thus the cle2r implicaticn of the Anglo-Saxon law that the 
host nation would not be able to obtain genetic resources from the trustee without the 
assent of the beneficiary. 
Q 
Under this body of law, the trustee is “under d duty to the beneficiary to take 
reasonable steps to take and keep control of the trust prope&,“2o and “to use reasonable 
care and skill to preserve the trust prcpertyY2’ Thus, under the analogy, the trustee 
centers are obligated to maintain the germplasm carefully; This could include, for example, 
an obligation to ensure that the material is duplicated in order to protect it from loss. 
With respect to the intellectual property question, the possible analogies cut bcrh 
ways, but generally favor the right of the trustee to obtain patent protection oniy ii t-x 
interests of the beneficiary are carefully protected. As just noted, the trust must be 
operated for the benefit of the beneficiary. This requires the trustee “to use reasonable 
care and skill to make the trust property productive.“22 In the case of institutions hclding 
the materials for the benefit of humanity, one can easily argue that obtaining intellectka.i 
” “A trust may be created by 
(4 a declaration by the owner of property that he hoids it as trustee for another person: cr 
(b) a transfer inter vivos by the owner of property to another person as trustee for :he 
transferor or for a third person; or 
II 
America;l ‘Law Institute, I Restatement of the Law 2d of Trusts 4 17 (1959). 
” Id. Q 266. There is an exception “if the purpose of the settler [trustor] in creating the trust is :c 
defraud his creditors or other persons.” Id. 9 63. 
:9 
" Id. 4 176. 
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property protection is a way to gain protection against the possibility that a windfall profit 
would be gained by the private sector and thus be lost from the internaticnal public sector 
research community. Thus, the trust doctrine gives support for a right -- and even an 
obligation --- to patent. The negative argument is that traditional trust law seriously restricts 
self-dealing on the part of the trustee, out of fear that transactions between the trustee and 
the trust would end up being unfair to the beneficiary. For example, a trustee is not to sell 
trust property to himself or herself;23 likewise, the trustee is not to commingle trust assets 
with his or her own assets, unless so permitted by the terms of the trust.24 Thus, the 
doctrine reflects a strong fear that the trustee will place his or her interest ahead of that of 
the beneficiary. By analogy, then, it would be essential for the CGIAR or the center to 
administer any patenting and the use of any royalties in a way that transparently ensures 
that these resources would be used for research that does benefit humanity. 
b. Other Private Law Systems 
There is a doctrine of fiduciary in the law of some civil law nations such as Gerrra-y 
and 3Aitzerlanii, but not of others such as Franca.25 France, hcwever, is considerir,; ST 
addition to its Civil Code to respond to the draft Hague Convention noted above. ?rs 
addition would create a new title in the Civil Code, governing a contract of “fiducie,” w~rh 
a Id. 9 170, Comment b. on Subsection (1). 
24 Id. 9 179 and comment f. 
25 C. Laurroumet, “La fiducie inspiroe du trust,” Recueil Dalloz 1990, cl 19-121. In the F:Px? 
system, one finds the “usufruit” doctrine as the closest analogue to an Anglo-Saxon trust. This ccc!:,:e 
describes, for example, the French legal treatment of an inheritance situation similar to that descnbw 
above, and the pattern is really closer to that of an Anglo-Saxon life estate. The person holding lhe 
property has the use of it during the period of usufruit, and can enjoy the fruits of the property, Code Civli 
§ 582, but is restricted in touching the principal. (See, e.g., the restrictions on cutting trees contain& Si~ 
4 592.) It is clear that the ownership of the property remains with the proprietor. Civil Code 5 5’5 
“Cusufruit est le droit de jouir des chases dont un autre a la propriete, comme le propri&ire lui-meme. 
mais a la charge d’en conserver la substance.” Thus, this law, designed to deal with a somewhat cifkrert 
situation, is equally clear in that a creditor cannot seize the property to the detriment of a beneficar! 
Because, however, the usufruitier is expected to enjoy the fruits of the property the rules against self- 
dealing are less severe than in the Anglo-Saxon pattern. The result would be greater freedom ‘cr 
patenting than in the Anglo-Saxon system. 
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. 
properties very similar to those of the Anglo-Saxon trust. It would be created by a settler 
(cons!ituant), and the rights and cbligations of the trustee (f&xi&e) would be quite similar 
to those of Anglo-Saxon law? 
C. Implications of the Trusteeship for the CGIAR Genebanks 
Certain material held by the Centers and Genebanks is presumably not subject to 
the trust doctrine. Certainly this is the case for proprietary material supplied under a 
specific contract. It is probably also the case for material that has received breeding 
attention and is improved from the material supplied in trust -- there has long been a 
differentiation between unimproved material and advanced material developed from such 
unimproved materiaL2’ The advanced material reflects an intellectual input separate from 
that of the unimproved sources. Such material is cieariy the Center’s asset: the Center has 
full rights to patent or dispose of it (save as those rights are affected by a particular gmt 
“Avant-projet de loi relatif i la fiducie,” 34 Rw. Ji;r!dique et Politique Ind$encfance et Coope:a:~ 
366 (1990). The arrangements with respect to‘the rights of third parties are presented somewhat 
differently than in Anglo-Saxon law, but have much the same effect: 
[Proposed] Articte 2067 - Les biens et droits transfkrk au fiduciaire former4 une masse 
skparke dans son patrimoine. 
Le fiduciaire doit prendre toutes mesures propres g &iter la confusion desdits droits et 
biens ainsi que des dettes s’y rapportant, soit avec ses biens personnels, soit avec 
d’autres biens fiduciaires. 
Sans prkjudice des droits des cknciers du constituant titulaires d’un droit de sui;e 
attach6 B une &et& nbe anterieurement au contrat de fiducie et hors le cas de fraude 
aux droits des cknciers chirographaires du constituant, les biens transfkrks au fiduciaire 
ne peuvent Btre s&is que par les titulaires de crknces &es de la conservation ou de 
la gestion de ces biens. 
The entire issue of this journal is a report of a 1989 colloquium on “La Fiducie ou 0.1 Trust dans les drolts 
occidentaux francophones.” 
27 Such a differentiation is really implied by the terms of the 1989 Agreed Interpretation (on Plant 
Breeders’ Rights) of the 1983 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. Report oi tie 
Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, Third Ses-sicn. Rome 1989, p. 12. 
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or contract); as a Center asset, such material would normally follow the terms of the 
Center’s estabiishment arrangements and host nation agreement upon dissolution. 
But the material in genebank base collections is, we believe, subject to the trust 
concept, no matter who is its formal legal owner. This is the clear implication of the 
CGIAR’s declaration; it is also the implication of the Undertaking’s recognition of “the 
universally =,ccepted principle that plant genetic resources ere a heritage of mankind.“‘8 
The question of formal ownership is relatively unimportant; what is important is that the 
centers have the responsibility to preserve and apply the material for the benefit of scientific 
research and the developing nations.*’ In developing the implications of the trust concept, 
however, we recognize that we are on untrodden ground. The application of this body of 
law to international genetic resources (or other similar resources) has not previously been 
attempted. Hence, we attempt to interpret the concept as well as possible and with the 
help of the Undertaking. 
1. Responsibilities to Conserve the Genetic Resources 
Under the trust concept, the trustee is, as noted above, “under a duty to tne 
beneficiary to take reasonable steps to take and keep control of the trust property,” and “to 
use reasonable care and skill to preserve the trust property.” This corresponds to the 
Undertaking’s emphasis, for example, on placing plant genetic resource activities “on, a 
firmer financial basis?’ The ideas of the trust concept clearly apply: the centers are 
obligated to maintain the germplasm carefully, and may have, for example, an obligation 
to ensure that the material is duplicated in order to protect it from loss. Likewise, they must 
seek to ensure that it is widely available for plant breeding should access be threatened 
by national action or the activity of a party gaining intellectual property rights over the 
material. 
2a Mefnational Undertaking on Plant Generic Resources, Article 1, FAO Resolution 8/83. 
The possible separation of legal and beneficial ownership is part of the point of the trust doctrine. 
For a discussion of legal (as opposed to beneficial) ownership, see Commission on Plant Gene?ic 
Resources (Footnote 1 above). 
3o Undertaking, Articfe 8. 
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2. Responsibilities upon Closure of a Center 
Uniform domestic interpretation of the trust ccncept, as reflected in the draft Hague 
Convention imply that the host nation has no control over the genetic resources contained 
in an international gene bank, Under the domestic law analogy, the host nation can be no 
more than a creditor -- and the entire operating pattern of international research suggests 
exactly the same result on a policy basis. Indeed, this is the major point of the 
International Undertaking’s position that “plant genetic resources . . . should be available 
without restriction?’ These materials cannot be taken by the host government and must 
instead be saved for the benefit of the global research community. 
The trust principles are slightly less clear as to whether the source nations of 
germplasm would be entitled to regain the materials under any such circumstances. Their 
interest is clearly adverse to that of the world community, which has build up expectations 
deriving from the existence of the iru.9. Indeed, it is traditionA Anglo-Saxon trust law inat 
a trustor, in general, has power to revoke the trust only if that power was reserved or in 
certain mistake-like situations.32 This would suggest that the source nation has Its: 
rights over the marerial. In contrast, under the French draft law, the trust assets WOL,C 
return to the original owner (either the genebank or the source nation) upon the dissolution 
of the trust unless the trust document had stated otherwise? The Undertaking, however, 
would certainly suggest an approach emphasizing global availability. It is thus the more 
sound principle that the materials should be transferred to the global research commNty 
rather than the source nation. This way, they can be available to all. 
3. Responsibiiities with Respect to Intellectual Property Rights 
As noted above, the trust arguments cut both ways with respect to intellectual 
property protection. Conservation and support for global research suggest that, if 
intellectual property rights are plausible, they be taken out in the name of the public sector 
” international Undertaking OR Plant Gene!ic Resources, Article 1, FAO Resolution 8183. 
JZ Restatement of Trusts 2d § 330. 
33 Draft Article 2070-2. 
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rather than of a private sector holder who might obtain a windfall profit, This may even be 
implied by the obligation of the trustee “to use reasonable care and skill to make the trust 
property productive? At the same time, the trust concept warns against self-dealing 
(although it is abundantly clear that the international centers are expected to use the 
materials for breeding). And both the trust concept and the Undertaking suggest that 
intellectual property rights should never be exercised to the detriment of the developing 
naticn farmer. Thus, any such rights shouid be waived or exercised at a zero rJya1t-y ir, 
developing nations, save. perhaps as part of a carefully supervised mechanism of private 
distribution to developing-nation farmers. 
Moreover, should there be patenting, the trust concept implies an obligation to 
ensure that any resulting profits (i.e. revenues from royalties less the costs of obtaining and 
enforcing patents) are transparently used for the benefit of the global research community 
in the interest of developing countries. It would undercut the trust concept if the profits 
were used to reduce donor nation support for the international agricultural research sys~m. 
Consider Art. XII (d) of the Memorandum of Understanding between Kenya and Rockefeiier cats 
Sept 21, 1973 concerning ILRAD’s responsibilities: 
Any vaccines or other discoveries which may result from work conducted by the 
Laboratory are intended to be of universal benefit and, in particular, to developing 
countries. It will, therefore, be the respons;bOy of the management of the Laboratory and 
its Board of Trustees to avoid exploitation of such vaccines and discoveries by special 
interests. Accordingly, arrangements concerning patents, royalty and other arrangements 
will need to be subjected to legal guidelines to be established at an early date, and such 
guidelines wiil be reported to the CGIAR. 
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IV. The Proposed FAO Base Collections Network and Other Options 
A. The FAO Proposal 
1. Origins and Status 
As part of the Undertaking, the FAO Conference called for: 
. * . an internationally coordinated network of national, regional, and international centers, 
including an international network of base collections in gene banks, under the auspices 
or the jurisdic!ion of FAO, that have assumed the responsibility to hold, for the benefit of 
the international community and on the principle of unrestricted exchange, base or active 
collections of the plant genetic resources of particular plant species.js 
Part of the purpose of this provision w‘as to provide the collections with any additional 
formal fegal status that would derive from their affiliation with the FAO, an organization with 
formal international personality. As the FAO suggested: 
. I . the ultimate responsibility for the conservation of piant Genetic resources covered by 
this network and for unrestricted access to such resources, should rest with an 
intergovernmental authority such as FAO. In this way, conservation and free exchange 
of these valuable resources would enjoy greater stability, since it would not depend solely 
on the policy, financial means, or diligence of any single government or institution. The 
conservation and unrestricted availability of plant genetic resources would, so to speak, 
be underwritten by an intergovernmental organization. Similarly, policies relating for 
example to the resources that should be preserved, or to access to such resources for 
plant breeding and scientific purposes, would be subtracted from the unilateral decision- 
making power of individual governments or institution.% 
35 Undertaking, Article 7. 
36 Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, Sludy on LegA Arrangements with a View to itie 
Possible Establishment ofm International Network dBase Cdections in Gene Banks Under the Auspices 
or Juri.sdic?:ion of FAO, CPGR/87/6, December 1986. 
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2. The Three Models 
The FAO has developed several models of agreements for placing genetic resources 
in the FAO network and the Joint Center Directors/TAG Committee on Plant Genetic 
Resources has suggested consideration of Models 8, C, and D. The three Models differ 
in several important respects with, in general, Model B transferring the materials most 
completely to the FAO, Model D transferring them least completely, and Model C offering 
an intermediate position. All are designed for signature by national governments; all include 
clauses for arbitration, ultimately with a neutral appointed by the President of the 
International Court of Justice. 
Under Model B, intended to place the materials under the “jurisdiction” of the FAO, 
ownership of the material is transferred to FAO, and the national government renounces 
the right to subject the germplasm to national legislation. The national government retairs 
ownership in the other cases. 
The other models only place the materials under the “auspices” of the FAO. VCZL 
B gives the FAO a right of access to the premises and a right, under certain circumstances 
to require administrative action to protect the material, as well as a right to set polices icr 
the material. Of these FAO rights, only the right of access is included in Model C, but tre 
host government agrees to involve FAO in the decision-making process. The FAO “es 
none of these rights in Model D. 
Models B and C include a procedure for bringing financial difficulties to the attentcn 
of FAO; there is no such provision in Model D. 
3. Applicability to the Centers 
Because these models all involve national governments, none is directly apprcprz:e 
to the CGIAR genebanks -- certainly an implication of the above analysis is that the ok: 
genetic materials in the CGlAR genebanks are not now held by host or other governmer:r 
Adaptation to a Center-FAO pattern would require a number of technical changes; ‘Y 
example, it is not clear that an ICJ role in dispute settlement between the FAO ant a 
center would be the most appropriate soluticn. 
In general, as trustees, the CGIAR centers are responsible themselves to manage 
the materials for the benefit of “present and future generations of research workers in all 
countries throughout the world.” Although it is possible to exercise this right through the 
FAO, the Centers will probably be able to manage the materials most effectively if they 
retain as much authority and flexibility as possible. This would suggest a model dose to 
Model D. With the other models, there wo;l!d be a need at least “to associate FAO with 
the policy-making process” for policies “in respect of activities related to the designated 
germplasm. (Model C, Art. 5) Thus, some decisions might have to be delayed, for 
example, pending consideration by the Commission on Plant Genetic Resources or the FAO 
Conference?’ 
At the same time, an adaptation of Model D might be valuable. Such a new “Mode! 
E” would put the collection under the “auspices” of the FAO. it wouldnot define ownership: 
neither FAO nor the center would be described as owning the germpiasm, but the Center 
might be described as holding it in trust. The FAO and the Center would both agree to 
help defend the rights of the beneficiaries of the materials in rare event that the future of 
the materials depended on a formal legal action. An arbitration prccess would have to be 
agreed upon. 
For most realistic threats to the materials, legal arguments will probably be 
overridden by such exigencies as a natural disaster or a civil war. In the rare case that 
a formal legal proceeding matters, that proceeding could be in a court that might consider 
trust logic or interpret a host-nation agreement on a reasonable basis. Bringing in the FAO 
provides an additional international legal basis for action, particularly if local proceedings 
fail to recognize global interests. 
B. The Political Argument 
While legally a sui generis arrangement of the kind discussed above (“Model E”) 
37 A number of governments have been queried as to the terms under which they would participate 
in the network. Of those answers given in a 1989 report by FAO, none was prepared to accept Model 
A and only Iraq would be prepared to accept Model 8. All the others willing to participate would accept 
either Model C or Model D. 
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would neither harm nor more than marginally reinforce the status of a center’s genebank 
collecticn, i: may wel! strengthen international solidarity should there be need to mount a 
rescue operation for a genebank that is jeopardized by war, civil disturbances or natural 
disaster. 
In the role of a “senior custodian” of all genebank collections in the world, national 
and international, FAO would certainly be called upon to coordinate a rescue operation. 
Because of its custodial. relations with genebanks worldwide (as proposed for the base 
collections network) it would also be in an excellent position to orchestrate an evacuation 
and determine where collections should be relocated. FAO would take on the lead role, 
closely coordinating its actions with IBPGR and the CGIAR, We would see this as a 
mutually supportive collaborative effort. 
Should the centers decide to join the FAO network under a sui generis arrangement 
this would also set a strong example for national genebanks to follow, thus helping to bring 
stronger international oversight to a global conservation strategy which currently lacks 
effectiveness. 
C. Other Options 
While the inclusion of center base collections in the FAO network may thus be 
desirable legally and politically, the CGIAR centers may still want to strengthen their current 
legal status. This would be particularly true for those centers whose current establishmen: 
arrangements are based on the law of the host country and could be modified by legislation 
in the host country. 
One could think of a standard agreement to be signed by each center and its MS: 
country. This could also be a convention to be signed by host countries, countries in wh~cn 
centers hold assets, all CGIAR centers, and CGIAR members. Such an agreement wouid 
explicitiy recognize the trust status of the materials and impose a strong obligation on hcs: 
governments to facilitate center operations. 
Because of our perception developed in this paper that center germplasm collecricrs 
are not part of center assets and therefore will not become the property of the host country 
in case of a center’s dissolution, we do not see the need for either of these options as a 
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legal mechanism of protecting these collections. They might, however, contribute to political 
recogniticn of the trust concept and might facilitate border treatment of germplasm 
shipments, especially phyto-sanitary and quarantine regulations where they impede imports 
and exports. 
In practical terms, and as an outgrowth of the obligations incumbent upon the 
centers as trustees of the germplasm, we strongly recommend that the material held in the 
centers be widely and systematically duplicated in different geographical areas of the areas. 
This should be done irrespective of possible political concerns with regard to a specific host 
country, and is clearly far more important han any formal legal approach to strengthening 
the safety of these materials. 
25 
26 
ANNEX I: Center Positions on Long-Term Security of Their Germplasm Collections 
On at least two occasions Centers were asked to assess the legal status of their 
germplasm collections: The first time in response to a request by TAC in 1988; and recently in replying 
to a questionnaire sent out by IBPGR which queried Center positions on the legal status of their 
collections; the applicability of FAO’s base collection models to the Centers: and the Centers’ adherence 
to the FAO Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. The responses to TAC were reported in TAC 
document AGiUTAC:IAW88/4 of February 1988 and are reprinted below under A.: responses to the IBPGR 
Survey of 1991 are reproduced under B. 
A. Center Positions Reported to TAC in 1988 
CIAT A recent agreement (to be ratified) between CIAT and Colombia allows CIAT the right :o 
export seed without restriction. This right is extended for one year after either pari 
notifies the other of its intention to terminale the existence of the Institute. 
CIMMYT The existing CIMMYT agreement states that in case of termination, its assets shall 
become a part of the National Center for Agricultural Education, Research and Extensrcn 
PIan Chapingo. A proposed revised set of statutes states “in case of dissolution, the 
assets of CIMMM INT situated in the host or other collaborating countries shall ‘be 
retained by such countries and used for similar purposes or distributed to institutions 
having purposes similar to those of CIMMYT INT in the respective countries atier 
agreement between the governments of those countries and the Board in consultation Wh 
members of the CGIAR.” 
CIP CIP is developing an inter-gene bank cooperation system to conserve genetic rescurtes 
of mandated crops. Complete duplicate copies should be deposited in gene banks in :A: 
continents. 
ICARDA In the ICARDA agreement there is no specific reference to the gene bank. The ba~:t 
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host-country agreement states that, in the event of dissolution, the assets of the Center 
shall be retained by the hosl country. 
ICRISAT The ICRISAT constitution states that, in the event of dissolution, the disposition of all 
assets except any land within India and fixed capital improvement thereon, shall be 
determined by the CGIAR after receiving recommendations from the Governing 3oard of 
ICRISAT. 
IITA In tine event of its closure, IITA will move its germplasm collections to safe storage at a 
place determined by the CGIAR, and will leave duplicates of them with Nigerian authorities 
if asked to do so. 
1LCA All unique genetic resources held by ILCA are duplicated outside Africa, at Kew. ILCA 
has an agreement with the Ethiopian Government for the unrestricted movement of 
germplasm, in or out of the country, as required. There is a proposed agreement with the 
Plant Genetic Resources Centre (Ethiopia) to duplicate all original Ethiopian material in 
ILCA’s long-term store. 
IRRI The IRRI agreement states that no part of the assets and property of the Institute sha:l 
inure to the benefit of or be .distributable to its members and if the existenc,o oi try 
Institute is terminated for any reason, all its physical plant, equipment and other assets 
shall become the property of the University of the Phiiippines. IRRI will explore the host 
country’s concurrence to send out a duplicate set of the entire rice collection to 
appropriate sites for duplicate storage in the event of dissolution. 
WARDA It is agreed that, if WARDA were to wind up its activities, arrangements would be made 
by WARDA to relocate its germplasm collection in suitable centers within and outside the 
region. This agreement has been established not only with the host country, but also with 
all WARDA member states. 
8. Center Positions Reported to IBPGR in 1991 
Questions 
(1) LEGAL STATUS OF COLLECTION: Provide a summary of the legal arrangements 
between the Centre and the host country that affect the long-term security and legal 
aspects of all germplasm collections maintained by the Centre. This information was 
provided in the document AGR;TAC:lARW3i4 Sup. 1. If a formal agreement has been 
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signed, please endose a copy. 
(4 
(3) 
ACCEPTABILITY OF SIGNING ONE OF THE FAO MODEL AGREEMENTS: Three model 
agreements are proposed by FAO (B,C, and D). Indicate which, if any, of these models 
is acceptable and the Centre would agree to sign it. If one of the models is acceptable 
with modifications, indicate the model and explain the restrictions that are required or 
desired. 
ADHERENCE TO THE FAO UNDERTAKING: Respond YES is the Centre has formally 
agreed to adhere to the FAO Undertaking for Plant Genetic Resources or NO if it does 
not. If the Centre adheres with restrictions, state this and provide restriction details. Also 
indicate whether your Centre, though not adhering to the Undertaking, subscribes to the 
principles of the Undertaking. 
Responses 
CIAT 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
An international agreement between the UNDP and the World Eank formalized the 
creation of CIAT as an international organization on 28 May 1986. Subsequently, ;he 
Convenio between the Colombian Government and CIAT, signed on 5 May 1987, 
formalized the establishment of the newly international [word illegible in fax transmission] 
the right to import and export biological materials for its research requiring only a biii of 
lading for such operations and adherence to Colombian quarantine regulations. This tight 
is granted for the duration of the international agreement and will continue to be in effect 
for one year after one or both parties decide to terminate the Agreement (Article 8, 2~) 
There is a basic problem with the three models related to ownership. CIAT has never 
assumed “ownership” of the germplasm conserved in the Genetic Resources”, published 
in 1989, the germplasm of the IARCs is held in trust for the use of present and future 
generations of research workers in all countries throughout the world. ClAT has 
interpreted this policy in that this Center has trusteeship but not ownership. Since CiAT 
does not claim direct ownership, CIAT probably cannot make legal arrangements for 
transfer of ownership to FAO. This conclusion will need to be seen against the 
background of replies from other IARCs on this matter and possibly legal advice on the 
matter. 
Wrth respect to adherence to the FAO Undertaking we do not see any real impediment 
for CIAT provided that there is a system-wide decision in this regard, i.e. all Centers 
agree to adhere at the same time. We feel this would give us all many advantages in the 
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present cfimate. 
ClMMM 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
ICARDA 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
ICFIAF 
(1) 
The CIMMM, INT agreement with the Government of Mexico states ‘in case of 
dissolution, the assets of CIMMYT, INT situated in tine host or other collaborating countries 
shall be retained by such countries and used for similar purposes or distributed to 
institutions having purposes similar to those of CIMMYT, INT in the respective countries 
aiter agreement between the governments of those countries and the Board in consultation 
with members of CGIAR’. Irrespective of that, ail of our material will be backed-up in 
banks outside of Mexico. 
CtMMM has not signed any agreement nor asked for an opinion from our Board of 
Trustees if any such agreement should be signed. A type 0 agreement probably would 
be acceptable once there is a clear agreement of what is meant by ‘under the auspices 
of FAO’. I would prefer that phrase be deleted. 
It is my understanding that CiMMYT has not formally agreed to adhere to the FAO 
Undertaking. Neither do we have a policy on this. Probably we should decide cn jc:r! 
action on this raiher ihan have some centers agree and others not. 
In the agreement between ICARDA and its host country Syria there is no speciic 
reference to the genebank. The basic host-country agreement states that, in the even: 
of dissolution, the assets of the Centre shall be retained by the host country. 
The model agreement D proposed by FAO is most acceptable but if there is a commcn 
CGIAR policy on this issue ICARDA would join the other IARCs. 
The policy vis-a-vis the FAO Undertaking should be decided by the CGIAR for all centers 
in the System. ICARDA, though not adhering formally to the Undertaking, subscribes to 
its principles. 
Current agreement with Kenya does not cover depository and sharing of germplasm 
resources. As we get more invoived in germplasm improvement and conser~alcn 
research, there is a need to inciude this aspect in the new agreement with ttie ksi 
country. 
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(2) 
ICRISAT 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
ILCA 
(3) 
IRRI 
(1) 
ICRAF prefers TYPE C AGREEMENT which provides the flexibility for ICRAF to make its 
germplasm available either directly to users or through FAO. 
In principle, ICRAF supports the proposed FAO undertaking as a means of more effective 
sharing and conservation of genetic resources of the world. 
The ICR!SAT constitution s?aies ihat, in the event of dissolution, the disposition of 311 
assets, except any land within India and fixed capital improvement thereon, shall be 
determined by the CGIAR after receiving recommendations from the Governing Board of 
ICRISAT. 
The choice of a “model” may best be made in ciose consultation with ail IARCs, 
particularly the IBPGR. 
Supported in prindple. De!ails to be worked out in ecnsultation with 1BPGR and c:her 
IARCs. 
The Centre has an agreement with the Government of Ethiopia which allows the propeny 
and assets to be immune from legal processes, requisition, confiscation, expropriation 2nd 
interference and allows free movement of germplasm in accordance with the naticnal 
quarantine regulations. In the event of &sure, ?he obligations and physical assets ~11 
be distributed to institutions having purposes similar to those of ILCA as agreed by :he 
Ethiopian Government and ILCA Board in consultations with the CGIAR. 
ILCA would be willing to sign an agreement of the type D with FAO and is committed !o 
maintenance of the germplasm collection and free avaiiability of germplasm for bona-fide 
users. ILCA adheres to the CGIAR policy on plant genetic resources. 
The Centre has not formally agreed to the FAO undertaking on plant genetic resources. 
but agrees to the general principles set out in the undertaking. 
The information in the report AGWTAC:IAW88/4 Sup. 1 is taken from IRRl’s Articles of 
Incorporation and By-Laws, amended October 14, 1982. 
The second sentence beginning “IRRI will explore . ..’ is not part of the Articles, but 
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expresses IRRl’s perspective to agree with the host country concerning future disposition 
of the germplssm collection. 
Model D would be acceptable to IRRI. Since this model invoives only consultation with 
FPIO, and would place the collection under the auspices of FAO as part of the global 
system; it would ratify what IRRl’s germplasm program is already undertaking rouiineiy. 
Ctirrently IRRI does not adhere to the FAO Undertaking. IRRI couid adhere, in principle, 
to the FAO ‘Undertaking. However, adherence at this stage is difficult since the 
Undertaking itself has yet to be finalized, given the lack of consensus on a number c! 
clauses for which substantive modifications were suggested during the T’nird Session oi 
the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources in April 1991. Furthermore, current 
WAR discussions on lntellectuai Property Rights should be clarified in the context of the 
Undertaking. 
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ANNEX II: Details of Center Establishment Arrangements 
This Annex provides a discussion of the legal establishment arrangements of individual 
centers, A synopsis is attached. 
A. Establishment Arrangements of Centers established prior to the CGIAR 
Several centers sponsored by the Ford and Rockefeller Found&ions (IRRI, CIMMYT, CIAT, 
IITA) and FAO (WARDA) predate the creation of the CGIAR. 
IRRI . 
The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) was the first international center to be 
established and later integrated into the CGIAR. The elaborate legal arrangements for its establishment 
bespeak the fact that it was the first effort by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations to create such a 
center. 
The original agreement to establish IRRI was contained in a Memorandum of 
Understanding signed on December 9, 1959 between the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and the 
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the Government of the Philippines. That Memorandum 
of Understanding was replazed by IRRl’s Articles of Incorporation which were signed before public notaries 
in New York and Manila on February 18 and 29, 1960, respectively. IRRl’s by-laws were adopted by 
IRRl’s Board of Trustees on April 14, 1960. Tax exempt status was granted by the Philippine parliament 
on January 5, 1960, and a broad set of other privileges and immunities was granted by presidential decree 
of April 19, 1979. 
On October 14, 1982, IRRl’s Board of Trustees amended the Articles of Incorporation and 
the By-laws. The decision was notarized in the Philippines. The majn purpose of these amendments 
seems to have been to combine into these two legal instruments the various provisions contained in the 
other legal instruments mentioned. 
IRRl’s legal status was not affected by the amendments: it remains a corporation 
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established under Philippine law. The fact that the representatives of the Philippine Government on IRRl’s 
Board voted for the amendments and subsequently decfared before the notary public that the amendments 
had been apprcved by the Board does not give IRRl’s Articles and By-laws the quality of a treaty 
commitment on the part of the Philippine State. 
Privileges, Immunities and. the Treatment of Germplasm 
IRRl’s privileges and immunities appear to be comprehensive. Because they have their 
legal basis in an act of parliament and a presidential decree they could be revoked in the same way they 
were granted, without this entajling consequences other than liability for compensation under Philippine 
law.’ 
Dissolution 
According to its Articles of Incorporation, the Center has been set up for a term of 50 
years from its incorporation “unless earlier terminated in accordance with law”. This is proba’sl:i 2 
reference to Phiiippine law of corporations which shculd be expected to stipulata the majority rqkec :c 
terminate a Philippine corporation.’ 
If IRRI is terminated “for any reason”, all its physical plant, equipment and other ass&s 
become the property of the University of the Philippines. There is no room for a decision by its members 
or Board of Trustees, nor for consultation with, or agreement by, the CGIAR. 
CIMMYT 
The Centro International de Mejoramiento de Mai;z y Trigo (CIMMYT) and the Centro 
International de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT) were the next two centers to be created, both by !:e 
Rockefeller Foundation through agreement with the host governments. 
CIMMYT was created as an association under the laws of Mexico through a “civii 
partnership agreement” between the Government of Mexico and the Rockefeller Foundation notarized cn 
’ The First External Management Review of !F?RI suggested that because IRRl’s “international SE!& 
was accorded by Presidential Decree, IRRI should try to have it covered by an act of parliament. 
2 Under the original Memorandum of Understanding, now explicitly superseded by the ArWes cf 
Incorporation, IRRI could be terminated by acreEm%, ’ C,e!,tieen the Government and the two foundz:,zrs 
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April 12, 1966 in Mexico City. The original agreement provided for limited immunity from paying taxes on 
income. Informally, however, the government granted more extensive privileges to facilitate CIML0T.s 
operations. This inciuded exemption from taxes, import duties and restrictions, and the free movement 
of staff and visiting scientists. 
In the early 1980’s; developments in Mexico and Cclombia led the CGIAR to review the 
legal status of both CIMMM and CiAT. As part of a general anti-corruption drive, the Mexican 
government had changed its liberal policy toward CJMMYT in 1982, removing most privileges it had 
informally granted, and subjecting CIMMM and its staff to payment of taxes including income tax on staff 
salaries. CIAT, on the other hand, was drawn into a labor dispute with a former staff member which 
prompted calls for immunity from domestic jurisdiction. This led the CGIAR in 1983 to pass resolutions 
caiiing on the CGIAR Co-sponsors (FAO, UNDP and World Bank) to assist the ;WG centers and their host 
governments in finding a solution to their legal situation and to provide the Centers with “legal capacity 
and international status”. 
On April 29, 1988, the Bank and UNDP agreed to create “CIMMYT, INT” (for Internatic,ra!i 
which tcok over the international functions of the onginal CIMMYT (which continues to exist as “CIhlAILT 
AC”). The Headquarters Agreement signed on ‘May 9, 1988 between CIMMM, INT and the Mexican Stars 
exlicitly recognizes CIMMYT, INT’s legal capacity and intemationai status. 
Privileges, Immunities and the Treatment of+ Germplasm 
CIMMM’s 1988 Headquarters Agreement accords “the Centers funds, its assets and 
personnel” (officer-in-charge, non-Mexican staff and consultants) the privileges and immunities acccrdec 
other international organizations in Mexico under the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations of 1946 which Mexico ratified on May 10, 1963, and which is attached to the Headquarters 
Agreement (with exceptions for the acquisition of land and the treatment of Mexican employees). 
Generally, this appears to provide a satisfactory arrangement for CIMMYT. 
With regard to germplasm, the Headquarters Agreement explicitly exempts CIMMYT from 
duties, taxes and restrictions on import and export of seeds for research purposes, There are no 
provisions in the headquarters or estabiishment agreements concerning ClMMYT’s germplasm colledlon. 
Dissolution 
The headquarters agreement can be terminated by either party with a year’s notice. 
Assets situated in the host or other collaborating countries shall be retained by these countries cr 
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institutions in theses countries and used for similar purposes. Agreement between those countries and 
the Board of ClMMYT and consultation with CGIAR members is required. 
CIAT 
CIAT was created by agreement between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Government 
of Colombia on November 10, 1967. 
Following the 1983 resolutions by the CGIAR (see under CIMMYT above) calling on the 
cosponsors to assist CIMMM and CIAT and the host governments in resolving the problems found in the 
legal status of the Wo centers, the Bank and UNDP, on May 28, 1986, signed on behalf of the members 
of the CGIAR an agreement to establish CIAT ‘as an international organization possessing full juridical 
personality” according to a constitution annexed to :he agreement. A new headquarters ayeernest iljES 
signed between CIAT and Colombia on May 5, 1987’. 
Privileges, Immunities and the Treatment of Germplasm 
The 1988 headquarters agreement grants comprehensive privileges and immunities IO 
CIAT and its staff. With regard to germplasm, it allows import and export subject only to quarant!ro 
legislation, and its free movement within Colombia. Export procedures are reduced to presentation ci a 
bill of lading. 
Dissolution 
ClAT can be dissolved by its Board with a three-quarter majority. The headquaners 
agreement can be terminated by either parry with one years notice. The constitution permits the host cr 
collaborating countries to retain CIAT assets or distribute them in agreement with the Board in consu;Z:^ 
with the CGiAR. According to the headquarters agreement, CIAT and the Ministry of Agriculture WI 
determine the distribution of ClAT’s net assets. 
IITA 
A joint project by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the International Instittite 2’ 
Tropical Agriculture (IITA) was incorporated by decree of the Government of Nigeria No. 32 of July 2: 
3 Law No, 29 of 1988 dated March 18, 1988 (Diatio Oficial cf March 22, 1988) 
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1967 which was amended on June 17, 1974. 
Referring to the original Ford/Rockefeller proposal of March 19, 1965, and the ageener,ts 
earlier reached with the civil predecessor government, the Decree by the Military Government establishing 
IITA as a Nigerian institution provides for tax-free status and recognizes IITA as being international in 
character, operating under policies laid down by iis Eoard of Trustees. The decree also provides for duty- 
free imports of goods and materiais necessary for the operation of IITA and, for IITA staff, their families, 
trustees and visiting experts. 
Privileges, Immunities and the Treatment of Germplasm 
Efforts were initiated by IiTA in 1986 to be granted treatment of an international 
organization under a headquarters agreement defining additional privileges and immunities of IITA along 
the lines of those accorded in Nigeria to ILCA and ICRISAT. Such an agreement was siGned on Ju,r;e 
7, 1988 by the Federal Minister of Science and Technology and IITA’s Director-General. It provides for 
the inviolability of IITA’s premises, duty-free import and exports of Goods needed for IlTA’s operations. and 
privileges and immunities for its staff. In addition, Decree No. 32 allows IITA to “distribute improved $~nt 
materials to other research centers where they might be of significant value in breeding or improve:men! 
programs” (Art. 2 (d)).4 
Dissolution 
Decree No. 32 accepts only one reason for IlTA’s dissolution: “if the foundations 
discontinue financial support for the Institute and the existence of the Institute is thereafter terminated for 
any reason, all of the physical plant and equipment of the Institute shall become the property of the 
Government to be used by it for scientific or educational purposes.” (Art. 14). The clause has apparently 
not been updated to reflect the funding role of the CGIAR. 
There are no provisions on genebank operations or the disposition of IITA’s germplasm 
collection in case of cessation of IITA’s operations. 
4 As the Second External Management Review pointed out, the relationship between the mentionec 
decrees and the headquarters agreement is unclear. For instance, the headquarters agreement repeats 
several provisions, but not others of the earlier decrees, raising concern that all of the older provisions 
could be interpreted as having been superseded by the more recent headquarters agreement. 
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CIP 
The origin of the International Potato Center (Centro International de la Papa - CiP) dates 
back to 1965, when Peru signed an agreement with North Carolina State University for scientific 
cooperation aimed at creating a center for research on tuber and root crops. The Presidential Decree No. 
102.A of September 1, 1967,. announced that “There will be an international potato center in Peru”, and 
initial statutes were approved by the government on November 29, 1968 (Supreme Decree No. 204-68- 
AG). 
A formal agreement creating CIP and at the same time setting out its rights and obligations 
was signed on January 20, 1971 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellor of North 
Carolina State University, 
On June 13, 1972, CIP’s Director-Genera) by appearing before a not&-j public in tima. 
Peru, placed CIP’s Statutes in the Peruvian Public Registry of Associations. 
According to the 1989 External @nagement Review, CIP’s agreement with the governmeni 
of Peru is working satisfactorily. “Nevertheless, constant vigilance is required on CIP’s part to make cer?s.ir; 
that the authorities (those who on a day-to-day basis monitor imports and collect duties and taxes) 
understand the privileges and immunities Peru has in fact accorded to CIP”. The panel failed to explain 
what aroused its concerns in this regard. 
The January 1971 agreement limited CIP’s term of operations to a period of ten years. 
In 1975 this was extended to 20 years, and again in February 1982 until January 20, 2000. 
The statutes authorize CIP to collect, maintain end distribute germplasm in order that it 
may be used both nationally and internationally (Art. 3.b). 
Privileges, Immunities and the Treatment of Germplasm 
The above mentioned agreement between the Government of Peru and North Carolina 
State University (January 20, 1971, Decree Law No, 18708 of December 29. 1970) grants comprehensive 
privileges and immunities to allow CIP to operate: movement of staff in and out of the country, duty-free 
importation of needed machinery, equipment, materials and vehicles, tax exemption on sales of products; 
“free movement of seeds and genetic material inside and out of Peru, according to Peruvian sanitary 
regulations” (Art. 14.d); and exemptions from income taxes for internationally recruited staff members. 
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Dissolution 
Under the January 20, 193 Agreement, all assets wculd, in case of CIP’s dissolution, be 
transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture of Peru. 
. ’ 
WARDA 
The inclusion of the West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA) in the CGIAR 
was a prime concern of the FAO when the CGlAR was set up in 1971. Following a conference in 
Monrovia in September 1969 of 11 West-African nations at which it was decided to form WARDA, FAO 
prepared a “constitution” which was adopted under the “Final Act” of a conference of the same countries 
held on September 1-4, 1970, in Dakar, Senegal. 
When civil war made WARDA’s operations in Liberia impossible, its Council of Minrsters, 
in December 1986, decided to move WARDA’s headquarters to Cote d’lvoire. The new headquarter 
agreement with Cote d’lvcire dates from Septe.mber 22, 1989, 
The headquarters agreement states that all germpiasm samples held by WARDA are the 
property of its member states, without specifying whether this means joint and several ownership or 
ownership by individual member states. This appears to be the only provision on ownership of germplasm 
in a center establishment arrangement. The agreement also provides for the event of force majeure ,;: 
which event it requires WARDA to relocate its collection.* 
Privileges, Immunities and the Treatment of Germplasm 
Under its constitution (revised in December 1986 to sanction to move of WARDA’s 
neadquarters to Cote d’lvoire) WARDA is entitled to pnviieges and immunities from its member countries. 
“The scope and privileges of the organs of the Association, its property, funds and assets and its stati 
shall be determined, mutatis mutandis, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on Privileges 
and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations.” Concerning biological and genetic 
material, WARDA is allowed to import and export what it needs to conduct its research, subject :o 
quarantine regulations. 
’ “WARDA member states are the legal owners of all germplasm samples held by WARDA in Cote 
d’lvoire. WARDA shall be the legal custodian of all such samples. In the event force majeure conditions 
render necessary a general relocation, WARDA shall deposit its germplasm samples with the mcst 
appropriate international germplasm bank.” (Art. VII .41 
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Dissolution 
WAFDA can be dissclvsd by unanimous decision of its member statas, and would stand 
dissolved once the number of member states falls below five. The Constitution stipulates that material 
cwned by WARDA contixe to be used for purposes for which they had been acquired without specifying 
a beneficiary for such continued use; while material made available by member states and organizations 
wculd be disposed of in consultation with these states and organizations. 
B. Establishment Arrangements of Centers Created under CGIAR Auspices 
ICRISAT 
The International Crop Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) was the first 
center to be established under the aegis of the CGIAR. The Ford Foundation which together WV ?r 
’ Rcckefeller Foundatio; had carried otit the preqara?cry work, was appointed by the Chairmzn cl: :r? 
CGIAR to act on behalf of the CGIAR. 
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed by four initial donors on February 22, i97i. 
In a “Special Accounts Agreement” of March 20, 1972, with the World Bank, the Ford Foundation agreed 
to launch the initial phase of the project. Under ihe agreement, the Bank opened an account a:.“~ 
disbursed project funds during the set-up phase. The Ford Foundation signed a Memorandum ci 
Agreement with the Government of India on March 28, 1972 which it endorsed to ICRISAT the fcilowx-c 
year on February 20, 1973. 
In the meanwhile, on July 5, 1972, FAO and the World Bank signed an agreement :I? 
behalf of the CGIAR to establish ICRISAT. 
Privileges, Immunities and the Treatment of Germplasm 
By notification of October 1972, the Gcvemment of India granted diplomatic privileges XC 
immunities by according ICRISAT treatment as a U.N. agency. In addition, the agreement between ‘?e 
Government of India and the Ford Foundation provides for the free movement of seeds and gene!rc 
material needed by the Institute, subject to quaranttne regulations. There are no provisions on gene%-- 
operations. 
Dissolution 
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The Institute can be dissolved by a three-fourth majority decision of its 6oard if its purpose 
has been accomplished or the Institute can no longer function effectively. Land and fixed assets will pass 
tc the Government while the CGIAR would determine the disposai of other assets on recommendatior,s 
from ICRISAT’s governing board. 
The International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases (ILIAD) was created in 
Kenya in 1973. A Memorandum of Understanding signed by eight initial donors on November 2, 1973, 
requested the Rockefeller Foundation, with support from the World Bank as disbursement agent, to initiate 
the first phase of the ILRAD project. The Rockefeller Foundation concluded a Memorandum of Agreement 
with the Government of Kenya on September 21, 1973 which the Rockefeller Foundation (as provided for 
in the Agreement) subsequently endorsed IO IL8,W.s Board of Trustees. According to it, ILffiD was 2 
operate as an autonomous, non-profit organization, international in character, and to be governed by a 
Board of Trustees. It was incorporated as a “company limited by guarantee” (Memorandum of Association 
of May 1 I 1974). Its original members were seven individuals who siqed the IMemorandum of Assccia!ion 
in their personal capacity and not as representatives of WAD’s sponsors. 
Privileges, Immunities and the Treatment of Germplasm 
Privileges and immunities are spelt out in the earlier Memorandum of Understanding, 
including freedom from import restrictions and customs duties of “all equipment and supplies deemed by 
the Laboratory to be required for the establishment and operation of the Laboratory and its program...” 
The memorandum contains an authorization “for the unrestricted movement of such scientific materials into 
and out of Kenya as may be needed by the Laboratory for its cooperative programs in any part of the 
world consistent with obligatory quarantine inspection” and with Government of Kenya assurance for prompt 
and expeditious inspection. 
Dissolution 
“Any property whatsoever” left upon the winding up and dissolution of ILRAD shall be cjven 
to charitable institutions in Kenya with objectives similar to those of ILFND (Memorandum of Associakn 
of May 1, 1974). 
ILCA 
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A Memorandum of Understanding was signed by ten “initial donors” in 1973/74 authorizing 
the World Bank and IDRC to initiate the establishment of the International Livestock Center for Africa 
(iLCA). Acting on behalf of the CGIAR, the Bairk, on July 16, 1974, signed with Ethiopia an “Agreement 
of Understanding” for the establishment of ILCA, which, in turn, it endorsed to ILCA on October 31, 1975, 
after it had been amended on June 13, 1975 to strengthen ILCA’s impcrt privileges. 
The Memorandum of Agreement was replaced by the “Agreement” between the 
Government of Ethiopia and ILCA on December 24, 1982. 
Privileges, Immunities and the Treatment of Germplasm 
The 1982 Agreement incorporates the privileges and immunities of the earlier ageement: 
it also authorizes the unrestricted movement of biological materials needed by the Center into and out of 
Ethiopia consistent with Ethiopian quarantine inspection. Center premises are inviolable. 
Dissolution 
ILCA can legally be dissolved only through mutual agreement of all involved, inciuci:; ‘-5 
CGIAR in which case “the rights, obligations and physical assets of the Center, other than bd, shail x 
distributed to an institution or institutions agreed by the Government and the Board in consultaticn ‘rc :Y 
the CGlAR and having purposes similar to those of the Center” (Art. 15). This includes, one shoi 2 
assume, institutions outside Ethiopia. 
ICARDA 
A complex legal structure was put in place to establish the International Center ‘3’ 
Research in the Dry Areas. This was largely conditioned by the diplomatic necessity to conclude Sass . 
equivalent agreements with three countries in the Region (Syria, Lebanon and Iran) without ;relucs.:,- 
where ICARDA’s headquarters were to be located.6 
6 “There is hereby established in Iran (Lebanon] an international institute called the InternaX-& 
Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Area (ICARDA)“, Art. I of the agreements between Iran *‘:? 
IDRC and Lebanon with IDRC. Note that the corresponding article in the Agreement with Syria estackrrs 
the Center “in the Region” defined elsewhere as the Near East, North Africa and the Mediterranean rec;:sIl 
In Article Ill.1 all three agreements stipulate that a ‘Principal Station of the Center” shall be located in ;C.e 
respective host country. That ICARDA’s headquarters were eventually established in Syria was the :PS -:: 
of political developments in Iran and Lebanon zt the ?ime 
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In November 1975, the World Bank, FAO and UNDP (the three co-sponsors of the 
CGIAR), and the Canadian International Development Research Center (ID%) which had agreed to be 
E;tecuting Agency in establishing ICARDA agreed on a Charter for ICARDA. 
IDRC subsequently negotiated establishment arran,, “ements for ICARDA on beha!f of the 
CGIAR which were signed with the three host countries as follows: Syria on June 28, 1976, Iran on july 
20, 1976, and Lebanon on July 6, 1977. Art. XIII of the three agreements allows ICARDA, upon a 
declaration by the Chairman of the CGIAR that the Center nas been established as a legal entity and was 
functioning effectively, to endorse the IDRC agreements with the result that IDRC’s role would lapse. It 
is not known whether this provision has taken effect. 
ICARDA’s By-Laws were established by its Board of Trustees on December 16, 1976 and 
amended several times. In 1985, Syria which currently hosts ICARDA’s headquarters negotiated an 
“endorsement” of ICARDA’s Gy-Laws which narrows the privileges L-d immunities earlier agreed upon u,it? 
IDRC. 
Privileges, Immunities and the Treatment of GFrmplasm 
With the implicit purpose to induce ICARDA to procure in Syria and to save Syrian foreign 
exchange funds, the 1985 “endorsement” subjects imports for ICARDA’s use to prior agreement with the 
Government of a list of required purchases. Because ICARDA would normally import its germplasm 
requirements free of cost, we would assume such i.Tports should not require prior Government consert. 
Dissolution 
The Board can decide on the dissolufion of ICARDA with a two-thirds majority. Land and 
fixed assets pass to the host state, while other ICARDA assets can either be retained by the host 
countries or disiributed in agreement with the Board after consultztion with the CGiAR. 
ICRAF 
The Agreement between the Government of Kenya and the International Developmz: 
Research Center dated November 21, 1978, established the headquarters of the International Council for 
Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF) in Kenya. IDRC sIgned the Agreement as Executing Agency for group 
of countries and donor agencies. IDRC undertook to set up ICRAF who, upon its effective establishment, 
endorsed the Agreement. 
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According to lCFL4F.s charter which is part of the headquarters Agreement and attached 
thereto (it was not attached to the copy of the headquarters agreement we received from ICRAF) ICWF 
has the sratus of an autonomous, non-pniit making, internationa! organiza?ion which is allowed :; 
incorporate itself under Kenyan law (and may have done so). 
The headquarteis agreement with Kenya and ICRAF’s charter are expected to be revised 
to reflect ICRAF’s recent inclusion in the CGIAR. 
Privileges, Immunities and the Treatment of Germplasm 
The headquarters agreement grants some immunities to ICRAF and its foreign statf, 
including an exemption from import and export restrictions and duties. There are no specific provisions 
for the handling of germplasm. 
Dissolution 
In case of ICFIAF’s dissolution,. assets other than land and improvements WC& -2 
distributed to institutions with similar objectives in agreement with the Board of Trustees, zx r 
consultation with the sponsors. This could include institutions outside Kenya. 
INIBAP 
The International NeWork for the Improvement of Banana and Plantain (INlBAFj kc.3 
created through an “Agreement to Establish the INIBAP”. It has been ratified by Belgium, Canada. 
Colombia, France, the Philippines and Senegal and became effective on August 25, 1990. Decree Xc. 
90-866 dated .., (text not available) sets out arrangements between France as host country and INlEA? 
Privileges, Immunities and Treatment of Germplasm 
Details of headquarters arrangements (i.e. the above-mentioned decree) not avail&e. 
Dissolution 
Upon dissolution of INIBAF an whrch its Eoard can decide with a three-quarters maic;‘:‘. 
assets other than land and improvements would be grven to institutions with similar objectives. 
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Footnotes: 
1. CIMMYT: Oflginal lnstrumant ol Eslablishment - Agreement between Got&RF establishing ‘Civil Partnership”, 1966, 
1988 Agreement between IDRDIUNDP created CIMMYT, INT. separate from CIMMYT, A.C: 
2. CIAT: Origlnal MoU, GoCIRF, establishing a non-prolil corporalion, 1967. The 1986 agreement belween lBRO/UNDP 
replaced the orlginat CIAT. 
3. WARDA: GrlQinal lnslrument of Establishment, agreement between t 1 Wesl Atrlcan and Sahetian countries, estabtishtng 
WARDA in Liberia, 1970. HO moved to Cote d’lvoire. 1986. 
4. ILCA: Orlglnal Instrument of Establishment, MoA:GoUIEtRD (1974) repealed and replaced by 1962 Agreement: GoUILCA. 
Abbrevialtons: 
DOT - Board o! Trustees 
FF - The Ford Foundation 
MoA - Memorandum of Agreement 
MoU - Memorandum of Understanding 
NCSIJ I North Carolina State tlniversity 
RF - The Rocketeller Foundahon 
nla - reference sources not awallable at lime of wfiling 
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ANNEX III: Draft Mate&l Trakfer Agreement 
The following draft of a Material Transfer Agreement has been prepared at the request 
of IBPGR. It is derived from the “Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement developed by the US. 
National Institutes of Health. 
The draft Agreement would be signed between a center and institutions/researchers that 
request to receive genetic material. With modifications. it could also cover the case where a center 
receives material for research purposes, Once signed, all shipments of genetic material from the Center 
to the Recipient would be covered under the Agreement. The Center would send out with the material 
a form letter as suggested in para 2.1 of the draft Agreement. It would keep copies of such letters icr 
later tracking needs. 
We investigated whether, in the absence of a signed agreement of the kind suggested, 
it would be legally sufficient for a Center to simply send out with the material a form letter setting out :he 
conditions under which the material was being made available, on the assumption that acceptance of the 
material and the letter would represent acquiescence in the suggested terms. While this might be sufficient 
in some legal systems, and the question is not without doubt in Anglo-Saxon law, it may not be sufficient 
in that system. Since a large number of exchanges of genetic material will be conducted with institutions 
in countries that follow the Anglo-Saxon law, we feel that a formal agreement of the kind suggested below 
which requires signature by both parties will be needed if a legally effective agreement is sought. Once 
a framework agreement is signed, however, there is no need to require a signature from the Recipient 
every time he or she receive a sample from the Center. 
The NIH agreement mentioned above is drafted in the form of a convention to be signed 
by collaborating research institutions. It also provides for a central depository which receives copies cf 
all instruments of signature and maintains a list of signatories. Center Directors may prefer such 
arrangement to signing individual agreements with each collaborator. In this case each center could either 
develop its own legal instrument and invite collaborators to sign it; or all centers could agree on a unifcrm 
convention binding a/l centers and their collaborators who sign up on it. The draft agreement below 
contains clauses to cover the latter alternative shown in square brackets in paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3. 
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ANNEX III 
Draft Material Transfer Agreement 
1. Background 
1.1 The CGIAR adheres to the principles of unrestricted availability and free exchange of 
germplasm. However, for reasons of fairness, and as custodian of the material held in trust in .its own 
genebank collecticns, the CGIAR must ensure that, if commercial users of this resource obtain from it 
economic advantages that greatly exceed the cost of their own research efforts (windfall gains), a fair 
share of these gains be retained for the benefit of developing countries. This could be accomplished either 
by making the research results obtajned from such material available to developing countries at no cost 
or on preferentiai terms, or by contributing to the research and conservation efforts conducted by the 
international centers for the benefit of developing countries. 
1.2 Signatory parties to this Material Transfer Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Agreement“ or “MTA”) are concerned that commercial terms of material transfer agreements do not impede 
the exchange of biological materials and, hence, the advancement of science. 
1.3 The parties that are signatory to this Agreement desire to utilize it to ensure that researcr. 
results that are in the form of biological materials be promptly transferred to other scientists in a rapid ant 
efficient manner 
2. Procedure 
2.1 The Center when making biological material available to others in accordance with this 
Agreement shall present a Letter similar to the following to any requestor: 
From: Sending Centker (the Suwliet) 
To: Receiving hstitution (the Recpient) 
The biological material descrbed below, [developed n the Laboratory of ; 6 
being made available to the Recipienl ti accordance wrlh the terms and conditions of the Material Transfer Ag:eerccr 
(MTA), which both the Suppiier and the Recpient have signed. 
1. Describe biological materral here (tie Materrat) 
2. Describe here any payment required to cover the Supplier costs of tipping or preparation of mater:a 
3. Describe here any special handling needed 
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Name of Canter (Supplier) 
Name of responsible individual 
3. Terms and Conditions 
3.1 Biological material (the Material) being made available pursuant to this Agreement is to 
be heid by the Recipient in trust and used solely for scientific research purposes in the facilities of the 
Recipient’s scientists and breeders. 
3.2 The term “the Material” shall include progeny and any modification to the Material, if such 
modified material is substantially based on or incorporates a substantial element of the original Material, 
or any modification which is not new or obviously distinct from the original Material. However, nothing 
herein shall be construed to prevent the Recipient from seeking patent protection on an invention arising 
from its use of the Material or to prevent or delay publication of research results arising from use of the 
Material. 
3.3 No rights are provided to the Recipient to use the Material and any related patents for 
profit-making or commercial purposes. 
3.4 If the Recipient is a commercial institution, and desires to use the Material and related 
patents, if any, for profit-making or commercial purposes, it agrees to negotiate in good faith a license with 
the Supplier prior to making any profit-making or commercial use. The Supplier shall have no obligation 
to grant such license to the Recipient, and may grant exclusive or non-exclusive licenses to others forthe 
use of the Material. .’ .’ 
3.5 The provision of Material to a Recipient is understood to in no way after any rights of any 
research sponsor of the Supplier. 
3.6 The Recipient of Material under this Agreement shall not transfer the Material to any other 
party without the prior written consent of the Supplier. 
3.7 Either the Supplier or the Recipient has the right to terminate this Agreement at any time, 
in which case the Recipient will immediately discontinue the use of the Material for research and, upon 
direction of the Supplier, return or destroy the Material. 
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3.8 The Recipient agrees to notify the Supplier of any transfer, by license or otherwise, of 
intellectual property rights, including rights in tangible property, to a third party if such intellectual property 
rights derived in whole or in part from use of the Material. The Recipient further agrees to notify such 
third party of the derivation of such intellectual property rights and that such third party may need rights 
from the Supplier in order to practice intellectual property rights provided by the Recipient. 
4. Administration 
4.1 By signature below of the responsible individual for the named institution, such institution 
has agreed that all transfers of biological material under the Form Letter of Article 2 above, shall be in 
complete conformance to ail terms of this Material Transfer Agreement. 
[4.2 Upon execution, the collaborating institution agrees to provide two executed copies to the 
[....I. A designated representative of [...I will acknowledge receipt by signature, return one copy to the 
signatory institution, and retain the other- copy as a record of the institution’s accession to the iist ci 
signatory institutions to this MTA. 
4.3 The [,J has agreed to maintain the Master List of signatory institutions here!o and 10 
provide that Master List, as it may be updated from time to time, to any institution, whe?her or not a 
signatory institution, requesting such list.1 
International Center 
Signature 
Date: 
Collaborating Institution 
Signature 
Date: - 
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